The Partnership letters are not a complete trade blotter. They do, however, disclose named investments, anonymous but quantified work-outs, control situations and a few later reconstructions. This index lists the 28 case files in the supplied research book without silently converting an unknown into a return figure.
The disclosed record
Capital and returns below follow the original letters or are labelled as later reconstruction. “Not disclosed” means the source does not support a reliable calculation.
| Case | Capital | Time | Thesis | Outcome / return | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Texas National Petroleum | $264,000 face amount of bonds; 64,035 shares; 83,200 warrants. Capital employed grew from about $146,000 to $731,000. | April 1962 to April 1963; bonds were held for under five months. | A publicly announced Union Oil sale and liquidation created a known payout, subject mainly to a delayed tax ruling. | Outcome: Union Oil closed on 31 October 1962 and staged liquidation distributions followed. Return: About 20% annualised on bonds and about 22% annualised on stock/warrants, as Buffett reported. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| British Columbia Power | Later portfolio reconstructions place the position at about 11% of BPL at 1962 year-end; the letters do not name it. | 1962-1963 era. | Government compensation cash plus a legal claim made the remaining company resemble a liquidating trust with litigation upside. | Outcome: Government compensation and litigation created bounded-value arbitrage; the exact BPL disposition is not in the letters. Return: Exact BPL return is not disclosed. | B - strong reconstruction, not named in the letters |
| Stanrock Uranium | Some secondary portfolio reconstructions report about 5% of BPL; no primary confirmation in the supplied letters. | Reported 1962. | A possible workout in later portfolio lists, but no reliably documented corporate action ties it to Buffett's workout book. | Outcome: Not established from the letters. Return: Unknown. | D - candidate only; evidence is too weak for a confirmed case |
| Unnamed hedged workout | Associated with roughly $340,000 of short securities; the long capital is not disclosed. | Late 1962, over a few months. | A hedge was used to remove general market risk so the profit depended chiefly on the corporate action spread. | Outcome: Completed profitably; Buffett withheld the company and transaction structure. Return: More than 10% gross over a few months, explicitly not annualised. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| The 1963 'sensational' workout | Not disclosed. | 1963. | One unnamed corporate action was large enough to dominate an unusually strong workout year. | Outcome: It heavily influenced the category result, but Buffett did not identify the company or transaction. Return: The workout category earned 30.6%; the individual return is undisclosed. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| The 1965 dominant workout | The workout category averaged about $6 million of capital. | 1965. | One unnamed situation supplied more than half of the year's workout profit, showing the effect of concentration. | Outcome: The category earned about $1.410 million; the individual case was not named. Return: About 23.5% for the category on Buffett's average-investment method; individual return undisclosed. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| The 1966 workout book | $7,666,314 average investment in workouts. | 1966. | A portfolio of mostly unnamed corporate-action positions, with realisations concentrated in the second half. | Outcome: A weak first half gave way to a strong second half. Return: $1,714,181 gain, or about 22.4% on average investment. | A- - category totals directly reported; underlying cases mostly anonymous |
| The 1967 failed workout book | $17,246,879 average investment in workouts. | 1967. | Several 'upset applecarts' demonstrated that deal failure, not market direction, is the central workout risk. | Outcome: The disclosed workout book barely earned a profit despite much higher capital than the prior year. Return: $153,273 gain, or 0.89% on average investment. | A- - category totals directly reported; underlying cases anonymous |
| The 1968 workout rebound | $18,980,602 average investment in workouts. | 1968. | A large, mostly unnamed workout book rebounded after 1967's near-zero return. | Outcome: A strong category year followed the prior year's broken-deal experience. Return: $7,317,128 gain, or about 38.55% on average investment. | A- - category totals directly reported; underlying cases anonymous |
| The 1969 government-risk workout losses | Near the upper end of BPL's historical workout allocation; no exact category capital was reported. | 1969, with some residual stubs expected to persist for years. | A rapidly changing government trend changed the probability tree across several ostensibly separate transactions. | Outcome: Severe losses and long-lived residual claims; individual names were withheld. Return: Exact loss undisclosed; Buffett said the Partnership would have been better off by 'some millions' absent his error. | A- - outcome directly discussed, but anonymous |
| The two unnamed 1957 influence positions | One position was roughly 10%-20% of portfolio assets and another about 5%. | 1957. | A cheap stock could become a self-created catalyst if continued buying gave the Partnership influence over corporate decisions. | Outcome: Names and realised outcomes were not disclosed. Return: Unknown. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| Commonwealth Trust Company | About 12% of the bank was acquired at an average price near $51 per share; it had earlier been a 10%-20% BPL position. | About one year, 1957-1958. | Deep value, a possible future merger catalyst and growing influence offered upside without a fixed closing date. | Outcome: Buffett sold the block at about $80 when a better special situation appeared. Return: About 56.9% simple price gain from $51 to $80; not a reported IRR. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| The late-1958 'better special situation' | Large enough to motivate the sale of the 12% Commonwealth Trust block; exact capital undisclosed. | Late 1958 onward. | Buffett could become the largest holder at an attractive price, but the company name was withheld. | Outcome: Unknown as a separately identifiable investment. Return: Unknown. | A- - directly described, but anonymous |
| Sanborn Map Company | About 35% of BPL net assets before resolution; Buffett and associates held about 24,000 shares. | 1958-1960. | The investment portfolio alone was worth more than the quoted shares; concentrated ownership could separate it from the weak map operation. | Outcome: About 72% of shares were exchanged for investment-portfolio securities at fair value. Return: Exact BPL return is not disclosed. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| Dempster Mill Manufacturing | Control interest averaged about $28 per share and represented about 21% of BPL net assets at a $35 valuation in 1961. | 1956-1963. | Gain control of a stagnant net-net, release trapped working capital and redeploy the cash before selling the operating assets. | Outcome: Operating assets were sold around book value; combined realisation was about $80 per share. Return: About 185.7% simple gain from $28 to about $80; not a precise IRR. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| The 1965 $3.188 million tender exit | One of BPL's largest 1964 private-owner positions; exact average capital undisclosed. | Position held into 1965. | A value investment entered as a private-owner general was unlocked by a later third-party tender. | Outcome: The investment was disposed of through the tender offer. Return: $3.188 million realised gain; $2.737 million economic gain attributed to 1965 after prior appreciation. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| The 1966 $1.269 million tender exit | $1,956,980 invested at 1965 year-end, with a $2,358,412 market value. | Mid-1965 to February 1966. | A cheap general was expected to absorb much more capital, but an unsolicited tender ended the opportunity early. | Outcome: Sold in February 1966 after a third party launched a tender. Return: $1,269,181 total profit; $867,749 attributed to 1966. | A- - directly quantified, but anonymous |
| Berkshire Hathaway | Average acquisition cost about $14.86 per share by control; BPL later owned 691,441 of 983,582 shares. | November 1962 to BPL's 1969/70 wind-down. | A cheap private-owner security became a controlled capital-allocation vehicle, not a conventional work-out. | Outcome: Control was obtained in 1965; the shares were distributed to partners rather than sold. Return: No realised BPL exit return was reported. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| American Express and the salad-oil scandal | Later Buffett disclosure: about $13 million, about 40% of BPL capital, for more than 5% of American Express. | Chiefly 1964-1967. | A severe one-time liability shock could be survivable if the traveler's-cheque and charge-card franchise remained intact. | Outcome: The franchise survived; later reporting describes a large gain and eventual sale. Return: Later reporting says roughly $20 million profit after about two years; the BPL letters do not give a precise case return. | B - later Buffett/public historical evidence; not named in the contemporaneous letters |
| Texas Gulf Producing | Historical reconstructions place about $4.6 million of BPL in the position in 1964. | 1963-1964 era. | A sale of substantially all oil and gas assets to Sinclair resembled the producer sell-outs Buffett described. | Outcome: The transaction was valued around $250-$252 million with an estimated distribution of about $62 per share. Return: Exact BPL purchase price and realised return are not disclosed. | C - plausible reconstruction; category is not proven in the letters |
| Pure Oil Company | Historical reconstructions place about $3.5 million of BPL in Pure Oil during 1964. | 1964-1965. | A potential value position evolved into a merger with Union Oil, but the entry date determines whether it was value investing or workout arbitrage. | Outcome: Pure merged into Union Oil on 16 July 1965; each common share converted into Union convertible preferred stock. Return: Exact BPL return is not disclosed. | C - plausible reconstruction; category is not proven in the letters |
| Blue Chip Stamps | 371,400 shares by late 1969, about 7.5% of shares outstanding. | BPL acquired shares in 1968-1969; distribution continued into 1971. | A restricted, illiquid block shaped by antitrust history created an exit-timing and market-impact problem. | Outcome: A planned public sale failed, so BPL retained the holding for a better sale or distribution path. Return: No clean BPL realised return is disclosed in the supplied letters. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| Diversified Retailing Company | BPL owned 80%; First Manhattan and Wheeler, Munger each owned 10%. | 1966-1969 BPL era. | A controlled acquisition vehicle let the Partnership buy whole businesses and recycle capital rather than wait for outside catalysts. | Outcome: It owned Hochschild, Kohn and Associated; after HK's sale it retained cash, securities and Associated. Return: No standalone BPL realised return is disclosed. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| Hochschild, Kohn & Co. | Later Buffett recollection: about $6 million of equity for a roughly $12 million purchase; BPL held it through DRC with two 10% partners. | First half of 1966 to 1 December 1969. | A negotiated whole-business purchase looked cheap but did not have the economics of a durable compounding retailer. | Outcome: DRC sold it to Supermarkets General for effective consideration of about $11 million. Return: Exact investor-level IRR is not disclosed. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| Associated Cotton Shops / Associated Retail Stores | Later Buffett recollection: an effective cost of about $4 million. | Acquired 1967 and retained beyond BPL. | A controlled retailer with a strong operator could earn high returns on modest incremental capital, making retention better than liquidation. | Outcome: Retained; strong years produced about 20% after-tax returns on required capital. Return: No BPL sale and no realised Partnership return. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| National Indemnity and National Fire & Marine | About $8.6 million combined purchase price in later Berkshire disclosures. | Purchased March 1967 and retained permanently. | An insurer's float could become a recurring source of investable capital, changing a control purchase into a compounding platform. | Outcome: It became the foundation of Berkshire's insurance and float model. Return: No realised exit; operating value compounded inside Berkshire. | A - named in the letters; purchase amount supplied by later Berkshire disclosures |
| Illinois National Bank & Trust | $190 per share plus a $2 per-share fee; 100,000 shares outstanding imply about $19 million gross equity if all shares were acquired. | 1969; later divested due to banking law. | A high-quality controlled bank offered good economics but the legal structure ultimately made continued ownership impossible. | Outcome: Berkshire acquired 97.7%; the bank was later required to be divested. Return: No BPL realised return is reported. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
| Sun Newspapers, Blacker Printing and Gateway Underwriters | Combined investment was a little over $1 per Berkshire share, according to the 1969 Partnership Q&A. | Late 1960s. | Small controlled acquisitions reveal where the control platform deployed capital, while also marking the boundary of a strict special-situations definition. | Outcome: Held as small operating units and not financially significant relative to Berkshire. Return: No case-level return is disclosed. | A - named and directly described in the letters |
How to read the record
The table separates capital, time, thesis, outcome and return because those are different claims. Some cases disclose all five. Others disclose only a category-level result or a company's later corporate action. For these, 'not disclosed' is a result of the research, not a blank to fill with hindsight.
The evidence label is equally important. A denotes a named case directly described in the Partnership letters. A- denotes a direct but anonymous disclosure. B and C identify later historical reconstructions; D is a candidate whose link to Buffett's work-out practice is too weak to treat as confirmed.
What Buffett's cases actually have in common
The strict work-outs have a corporate action and a clock: a sale, liquidation, tender, merger or similar event. Control cases are related but different. Buffett could create the catalyst by changing management, releasing working capital, separating assets or redeploying the corporate shell's capital.
The later acquisition cases show the third branch: a control investment sometimes deserves to be retained, not liquidated. Berkshire, National Indemnity and Associated Cotton Shops are therefore not honest examples of a realised short-term work-out return.
The key limitation
A later market quotation is not an exit price, and a category return is not an individual deal return. This site reports the figure Buffett or the supplied evidence base supports. It does not manufacture an internal rate of return where entry dates, cash flows, co-ownership or sale proceeds are incomplete.
Each row below links to a stand-alone case study. They are educational historical analyses, not a recommendation to buy or sell any security or to imitate the position sizes of a very different investor and era.
This guide is educational information, not a recommendation, investment advice or a substitute for reading the underlying disclosure.